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What are epistemic vices? How can we detect them in ourselves and others? 
Are we responsible for them? And finally, how can we counter them? In Vices 
of the Mind, Quassim Cassam offers the first extensive inquiry into the nas-
cent field of vice epistemology. Classifying epistemic vices into three categories 
– character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking – he provides a pliant meth-
odological toolkit for thinking about epistemic vices. To bring his points closer 
to home, Cassam illustrates each category with real-world examples of political 
failures caused by the epistemic arrogance, closed-mindedness, gullibility, or 
insouciance of their perpetrators. As he stresses in the preface, epistemic vices 
are inseparable from their political consequences. They, after all, lie at the base 
of poor decision-making, indifference to expert opinion, and careless voting. 
Cassam also articulates a theory of epistemic vice, obstructivism, which under-
lines their damaging effect on the acquisition and transmission of knowledge. 
He does note, however, that some philosophers might deem vice explanations 
overly personal, and instead opt for structural or sub-personal accounts of 
epistemic failures. For the sake of simplicity, I will, in reviewing the book, fol-
low Cassam’s line of thought. As the first comprehensive work in the domain, 
Cassam’s study is sure to guide future contributions to vice epistemology.
In the first chapter, Cassam introduces his theory of epistemic vice, ob-
structivism. As the name implies, the central feature of epistemic vices is that 
they systematically get in the way of knowledge. To stay true to Cassam’s 
terminology, they obstruct us in acquiring, retaining, and distributing true 
beliefs. Epistemic vices, in simpler terms, hamper our attempts to gain, keep, 
and share knowledge. Cassam discerns obstructivism from motivational ac-
counts of epistemic vice. Such models, inherited from virtue epistemology, ar-
gue that epistemic virtues and vices entail a distinct motivational component. 
According to motivational theories, epistemic virtues such as conscientious-
ness, diligence, and open-mindedness rest on a lively interest in attaining the 
truth. Yet, Cassam argues, it would be misguided to say that epistemic vices 
are motivated by a calculated quest for ignorance. While it would be some-
what more reasonable to support the intermediate position, which claims that 
epistemic vices might hinge upon an overly lenient approach to knowledge, 
a dearth of positive motivation, Cassam maintains that their crucial feature is 
that they, by inspiring unreliable epistemic conduct, obstruct our intellectual 
endeavors. What is more, not all epistemic vices entail a negative motivation: 
closed-mindedness is, for example, motivated by the desire for intellectual 
closure, which does not have to be harmful. Obstructivism defines epistemic 
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vices as “blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, 
and ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or 
sharing of knowledge” (23).
Epistemic vices, then, come in different shapes and sizes. Cassam identi-
fies three main types of epistemic vices: (i) character traits, stable dispositions 
to act in a particular manner, (ii) attitudes, which presuppose an object of our 
affective stances, and (iii) ways of thinking, isolated epistemic blunders that 
do not require a genuinely vicious character. To find out whether an epistemic 
vice is a character trait, an attitude, or a way of thinking, we need to inquire 
which of the options enjoys explanatory primacy. For instance, we cannot 
describe a wishful thinker (a person of a particular character) without ap-
pealing to the practice of wishful thinking (a mode of thought). The reverse, 
however, does not hold true: we can easily explain what wishful thinking is 
without conjuring up a person who habitually engages in such thinking. As 
wishful thinking is explanatorily prior to being a wishful thinker, Cassam 
concludes that it is a way of thinking. Similarly, prejudice is an attitude be-
cause we cannot outline a prejudiced character without explaining what it is 
that makes them prejudiced: their negative affective posture towards particu-
lar objects. Regarding our responsibility for our harmful epistemic conduct, 
Cassam briefly distinguishes two kinds of responsibility: acquisition respon-
sibility and revision responsibility. Albeit we are not always responsible for 
acquiring our vices, he will later maintain that we remain responsible for sub-
duing them, which equips us with enough revision responsibility to be con-
sidered culpable. Cassam then notes that some philosophers might consider 
vice explanations too personal, and instead opt for structural or sub-personal 
accounts of epistemic phenomena. Structural explanations seek the causes 
of epistemic failures in the broader systems that frame and direct individual 
behavior. Sub-personal explanations, too, do not hold individuals liable for 
their epistemic blunders. Instead, they focus on the automatic cognitive bi-
ases that underlie our behavior. Although he acknowledges the advantages of 
such approaches, such as the fact that structural theories explore more exten-
sive systems of inequality, Cassam maintains that a study of epistemic vices is 
indispensable for a proper understanding of our conduct.
Cassam elaborates his conception of vicious character traits on the example 
of closed-mindedness, illustrating it with the case of Eli Zeira, the Israeli gen-
eral whose obstinacy had him dismiss ample evidence of the incoming attack 
by Egyptian forces. Although Israel had excellent information about Egypt’s 
plans to assault them, Zeira’s conviction that there would be no conflict com-
pelled him to disregard all opposing facts. Cassam then defines character vices 
as “stable dispositions to act, think, and feel in particular ways” (31). Like moral 
vices, epistemic vices can be high or low fidelity. In simpler terms, high fidelity 
vices entail a high consistency of behavior across different contexts and are not 
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subject-specific. Someone who is only closed-minded regarding a particular 
topic, such as the virtues of their child, is not a candidate for the epistemic vice 
of closed-mindedness. Low-fidelity character traits, in contrast, require only 
occasional displays of vicious behavior. Just like one instance of gross cruelty 
is sufficient to qualify one as cruel, an isolated incident of gullibility demar-
cates us as somewhat gullible. Cassam contends that most character vices are 
high-fidelity traits, requiring repeated demonstrations of vicious behavior. The 
exemption here is gullibility, since gullible people do not need to consistently 
fall prey to fraud. Regarding the question of whether we can remedy our char-
acter vices, Cassam distinguishes them from personality traits, which are deeply 
entrenched and immutable. As we can attempt to amend our character, we 
have enough revision responsibility to be held culpable for our vices. Cassam 
closes the chapter by implying that all character vices stem from vicious ways of 
thinking, a proposition he further explores in the following section.
In the section on thinking vices, Cassam defines them as “epistemically 
vicious ways of thinking or thinking styles” (55). He then elaborates his ear-
lier position that thinking vices are explanatorily prior to vicious character 
traits: In order to describe a harmful feature of someone’s character, we must 
refer to that what makes it vicious, an epistemically damaging thinking habit. 
To illustrate a closed-minded person, for one, we would need to describe the 
closed-mindedness of their thinking – their reluctance to consider opposing 
information and give up on long-held beliefs. So, although closed-minded-
ness is usually treated as a paradigmatic character vice, an inquiry into vicious 
ways of thinking can help us identify isolated epistemic blunders that do not 
require a genuinely harmful character. Recalling Daniel Kahneman’s distinc-
tion between slow thinking, which is goal-oriented and involves intentional 
efforts, and fast thinking, which is automatic and subconscious, Cassam ar-
gues that thinking vices can occur in both.
Cassam then, proceeding to vicious attitudes, illustrates them with epis-
temic insouciance, an indifference towards evidence and truth, and brings up 
the example of the Brexit campaign in 2016, which disseminated incorrect 
data about Britain’s obligations towards the European Union. Unlike vicious 
character traits and thinking vices, attitudes presuppose an object of our af-
fective states. Another attitude vice, prejudice, validates this point, as it entails 
a negative emotional posture towards vulnerable social groups. In that vein, 
Cassam detects two categories of vicious attitudes: postures, which are affec-
tive and involuntary, and stances, which involve a considered belief towards a 
particular object. Returning to the example of epistemic insouciance, it is an 
epistemically detrimental posture of indifference towards truth and respon-
sible inquiry. While epistemic insouciance is mostly unconscious, as it is not 
motivated by a deliberated disregard for truth, other vicious attitudes, such 
as epistemic malevolence, qualify as stances. Cassam exemplifies epistemic 
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malevolence with the tobacco industry’s efforts to annul evidence of the detri-
ments of smoking, and describes it as a willful intention to obstruct the ac-
quisition and transmission of truth. Concerning the question of our liability 
for vicious attitudes, Cassam maintains that we are revision-responsible for 
attempting to improve them. He closes the chapter by stressing that attitude 
vices are explanatorily prior to vicious character traits and that the relation-
ship between attitudes and thinking vices is somewhat more complicated.
Recall that obstructivism had defined epistemic vices as blameworthy or 
otherwise reprehensible behaviors that hamper the acquisition and transmission 
of knowledge. Cassam then, inquiring whether we can indeed be blamed for 
our vices, returns to his initial distinction between acquisition responsibility and 
revision responsibility. Regarding the former, we are responsible for our vices if 
our choices and behaviors had somehow encouraged the development of the 
vice. Similarly, when it comes to revision responsibility, we are culpable if we can 
revise or subdue our vices, but fail to do so. Arguing that revision responsibil-
ity requires control over our vices, Cassam proceeds to identify three types of 
control. First, there is voluntary control, our ability to do things at will. Second, 
evaluative control concerns our freedom to change our beliefs following evalua-
tions of what is true. Third, managerial control enables us to manipulate our be-
liefs and surroundings in accordance to our wishes. Cassam then concludes that 
the type of control required for making us blameworthy depends on whether we 
are dealing with a vicious character trait, a thinking vice, or a harmful attitude. 
He maintains that control is a necessary condition of culpability, as we cannot 
be held liable for something we did not bring about, and cannot change.
In his discussion of epistemic vices and knowledge, Cassam inquires 
whether the vice of dogmatism can foster knowledge by protecting our true 
beliefs from unreliable evidence. According to philosophers such as Kripke, 
assuming a dogmatic stance towards our core creeds can shield them from 
assaults we would be otherwise unable to dismiss. An average epistemic agent 
is, for instance, justified in dogmatically refusing to entertain theories in fa-
vor of astrology, even if they lack the expert knowledge needed to disprove 
each particular claim. Cassam then recalls Kuhn’s stance that work within 
normal science, an established scientific paradigm, is inherently dogmatic. 
Scientists carefully apply the learned procedures and accord the results to 
what they have been taught to expect, making no effort to question the theo-
retical underpinnings of their discipline. If dogmatism is indeed conducive 
to scientific progress, this confronts us with an inconsistency – namely, an 
attitude is only vicious if it systematically gets in the way of knowledge. And, 
if dogmatism is an organic part of normal scientific functioning, then it does 
not hamper the acquisition of knowledge. This conclusion leaves us with 
three possibilities. First, dogmatism might not be an epistemic vice. Second, 
epistemic vices might not be a systematic barrier to knowledge, which would 
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require us to rethink the central tenet of obstructivism. Third, the epistemic 
phenomenon in Kuhn’s account might be something other than dogmatism. 
After rejecting the first two options, Cassam proceeds to argue that the atti-
tude in question is actually intellectual firmness, a justified trust in one’s core 
beliefs. Without such firmness, we would fall victim to the vice of intellectual 
flimsiness, the inability to stand by our established knowledge. True dogma-
tism is an irrational adherence to spurious doctrines that resists all conflicting 
evidence and, as such, an epistemic vice. Scientists respectful of the dominant 
paradigm display no such obstinacy. When the orthodox framework proves 
insufficient for making sense of the incoming data, science undergoes a para-
digm shift, and scientists embrace a new theoretical foundation.
Cassam then argues that some epistemic vices are stealthy in that they 
stymie their own detection. For instance, someone closed-minded might be 
so invested in the image of themselves as a virtuous epistemic agent, and so 
unwilling to consider conflicting views, that they will remain ignorant to the 
fact they are closed-minded. An epistemically arrogant person will, similarly, 
dismiss notions that they might be overly self-assured, instead choosing to 
deem their confidence justified. Echoing Miranda Fricker’s work on preju-
dice, Cassam argues that stealthy vices hamper the critical reflection needed 
to identify them by “nullifying or opposing the very epistemic virtues on 
which active critical reflection depends” (149). According to Cassam, critical 
reflection hinges upon the virtues of open-mindedness and humility, the op-
posites of closed-mindedness and epistemic arrogance, which he detects as the 
stealthiest of vices. Cassam likens stealthy vices to the Dunning-Kruger effect 
in psychology, when incompetent individuals lack the metacognition needed 
to grasp and assess their incompetence. He then inquires how we can over-
come stealthy epistemic vices. When critical reflection fails, there are two al-
ternatives: self-knowledge from testimony, when others alert us of our vicious 
behavior, and breakthrough experiences, when the negative consequences of 
our vices force us to acknowledge the errors of our epistemic ways. Yet, Cas-
sam notes, even self-knowledge from testimony can fall prey to stealthy vices. 
A closed-minded person will, for instance, likely disregard evidence that op-
poses their entrenched view of self. Does the stealthiness of certain vices, the 
fact they evade detection, exonerate us from blame? Not necessarily. Even if 
we are ignorant of our vices because they are hard to detect, we remain re-
sponsible for our ignorance, and, consequently, for our behavior.
Cassam closes the book by inquiring whether there is room for self-
improvement. He rejects epistemic pessimism, the view that we are not in 
control of our vices because they are immutable, and instead opts for “quali-
fied optimism” (171). According to this stance, remedying our vices requires 
considerable self-awareness, motivation, effort, and skill, but is nonetheless 
possible. Using the example of sub-personal cognitive biases, Cassam argues 
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that, to revise our vicious behavior, we need to be aware of our biases, be 
motivated to improve them, and undergo the necessary effort to control 
them in our everyday lives. While we cannot merely wish our biases away, 
we can use specific psychological strategies to diminish them, which equips 
us with enough managerial control to make us blameworthy. Yet, Cassam 
retains a much-needed dose of realism: although self-improvement is not 
always possible, it sometimes is, and it is surely a worthy endeavor. When 
there is indeed no room for improvement, because the biases are either too 
deeply entrenched or too challenging to dispel, we can attempt to outsmart 
them by way of institutional measures. For instance, we can outsmart the 
prejudicial beliefs of decision committees by insisting on blind reviews and 
standardized procedures, which shield vulnerable social groups from deflated 
assessments of credibility. While such techniques do not annul our epistemic 
vices, they help mitigate their consequences. Cassam concludes that stark 
epistemic pessimism is untenable: The prospect that epistemic vices can be 
neither improved nor evaded is “too ghastly to contemplate” (187), and we 
should continue seeking ways to amend them.
Having articulated a framework for classifying different epistemic vices, 
and a theory that underlines their detrimental effect on gaining and shar-
ing knowledge, Cassam has set vice epistemology on a stable methodological 
footing. Further philosophical efforts, still, remain to be made. Future works 
in vice epistemology might want to explore the causal link between sub-per-
sonal cognitive biases and epistemic vices. It does seem as if epistemic vices 
build on the foundations provided by our cognitive makeup, such as con-
firmation bias, the tendency to seek information that confirms our present 
beliefs. It would be just as interesting to inquire about the balance of struc-
tural and personal explanations of epistemic failures. This inquiry would help 
us determine when we should opt for either approach and how they can be 
conjoined. We can also work on more nuanced accounts of blame. The ques-
tion of when we are responsible for acquiring and revising or vices is worthy 
of careful philosophical scrutiny. Finally, it is crucial to study the room for 
improvement while remaining realistic about our cognitive limitations. Only 
then can we distinguish cases that call for intentional efforts from more tax-
ing scenarios when we should merely aim to outsmart our biases by way of 
institutional methods. Cassam’s fruitful philosophical toolkit, which identi-
fies different categories of vices and different kinds of control, would surely 
contribute to each of these topics. Our task, then, is to put it to good use.
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